While UN peacekeeping operations are in most cases confronted with a multitude of intertwined problems, this seems to be even worse in Africa.
1
Introduction and set-up of the paper 'UN peacekeeping' and 'Africa' are not a natural fit. The combination of words is associated more often with failures than with success stories. While UN peacekeeping operations are in most cases anyhow confronted with a multitude of intertwined problems, this seems to be even worse in Africa. African operations have to react more than averagely to inter-as well as intrastate conflicts based upon ethnic tension, to conflicts starting from extreme poverty or the abuse of natural resources, and to situations in which governments are
failing to do what governments should do. In the present paper the mandates of the six ongoing UN peacekeeping operations on African soil are analysed from the perspective of their (desired) contribution to the establishment of good governance structures.
The paper starts by giving some general background on peacekeeping in Africa and on the concept of good governance (section 2), followed by a detailed investigation of good governance at six ongoing African peacekeeping operations (section 3). Having done so, the paper continues by presenting 44/252 more general observations as to trends in UN peacekeeping and their consequences for Africa (section 4), followed by a summary and some overall concluding observations (section 5).
The research has been concluded at 1 May 2007.
2
The core concepts of the paper
Peacekeeping in Africa
Since its first official peacekeeping operation -the United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEF 1), active in the Middle East from 1956 to 1967 -the UN have deployed about sixty such operations. They have been started and maintained for a variety of reasons which however are often not evidently covered by the word 'peacekeeping'. Sometimes there is no peace to be kept at all, and is the mandate of the missions more related to peace-enforcement -in which cases the UN these days often cooperates with NATO -or to, for instance, reconstruction of governmental and other structures. In the latter case, the label 'peace-building' is commonly used. Nevertheless, the word 'peacekeeping' is still standard -including within the UN itself -as an overall phrase for this variety of operations.
Using different labels, one should keep in mind that this is about more than words only. The so-called 'Brahimi report', evaluating the UN peacekeeping system after some failures in the early 1990s and to be discussed from the perspective of the present paper later on, states that it should have come as no surprise …that some of the missions of the past decade would be particularly hard to accomplish: they tended to deploy where conflict had not resulted in victory for any side, where a military stalemate or international pressure or both had brought fighting to a halt but at least some of the parties to the conflict were not seriously committed to ending the confrontation. United Nations operations thus did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create them. In such complex operations, peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment while peace-builders work to make that environment 45/252 self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, making peacekeepers and peace-builders inseparable partners.
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This language reflects the dynamics in (thinking about) peacekeeping operations and shows some of the problems this paper will discuss in sections two and three.
In this section the observation is maintained that 16 out of the 44 operations of the past related to African States, while six out of the current 15 operations - 
Good governance
Over the last couple of decades, a wealth of academic and policy-oriented literature on good governance has been produced, clarifying and criticising the concept as well as making it as operative as possible. The latter relates to the use of the concept in the areas of especially international development and international economic relations, for example, through practices developed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 4 Further to that, the concept is elaborated upon in, for instance, the context of discussions on the UN human rights machinery. 5 The present paper does not intend to discuss the concept of good governance in itself, but focuses upon its links to the field of 46/252 peace and security. As a matter of fact, it would be easy to elaborate in a lengthy way upon the concept of good governance, but for the present paper it would do to follow the no-nonsense approach as taken by, amongst others, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). According to UNESCAP, 'governance' means, simply put, "the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)", while the word governance is used "in several contexts such as corporate governance, international governance, national governance and local governance". 6 In the context of the present paper the focus will be on the establishment of effective national governments, on the (human rights and other) values they have to take into account when performing their governmental tasks, and on the role UN peacekeepers can play in the process of paving the way towards a situation in which national governments can effectively "handle their own business". In the words of UNESCAP, further dividing the issue in manageable parts, one would have to take into account eight major factors/characteristics when discussing and practising good governance:
It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and follows the rule of law.
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Further to that, or better: as part of that, it also "assures that corruption is minimized", that "the views of minorities are taken into account", that "the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making" and that it is also "responsive to the present and future needs of society".
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Before proceeding, a few explanatory words might be needed on the subconcepts used by UNESCAP that are relevant for the present paper as well. In the order in which the core characteristics have been presented before:
6 UN http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp 17 Jul. 7
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47/252
• Participation by both men and women could be either direct or through legitimate intermediate institutions or representatives. Representative democracy does not necessarily mean that the concerns of the most vulnerable in society would be taken into consideration in decisionmaking. Participation needs to be informed and organised. This means freedom of association and expression on the one hand and an organised civil society on the other hand.
• Consensus oriented. Good governance requires mediation of the different interests in society to reach a broad consensus on what is in the best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It also requires a broad and long-term perspective on what is needed for sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of such development.
• Accountability is a key requirement of good governance. Not only governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society organisations must be accountable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Who is accountable to whom varies depending on whether decisions or actions taken are internal or external to an organisation or institution. In general an organisation or an institution is accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Accountability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law.
• Transparency means that decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and media.
• Responsiveness. Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe.
• Effectiveness and efficiency. Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at their disposal. The concept of 48/252 efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and -in the long run -the protection of the environment.
• Equity and inclusiveness. A society's well being depends on ensuring that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all groups, but particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities to improve or maintain their well being.
• Rule of law. Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force.
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I would like to add two issues, relevant for the remainder of this paper. The first issue relates to the notion that time and again one has to transcend the idea that 'governance' is still basically about (traditional) governments who are in the lead of 'their' sovereign states. Governments are no doubt extremely important and central to the concept of good governance, but the major tasks they have to fulfil cannot be separated from non-state actors, such as populations, minorities included, companies and non-governmental organisations, the latter including for instance the media (although these are often also to be considered as state actors). Some of these non-state actors are already mentioned in the point-wise presented overview of core characteristics of good governance borrowed from UNESCAP, while it could be added here -having an eye upon The descriptions of the eight sub-concepts are based upon UNESCAP's wordings, and slightly modified and adapted to the scope of the present paper.
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The second issue concerns reading the eight key characteristics of good governance with 'human rights eyes'. The word 'participation' does include some core human rights (for instance: the freedom of association and the freedom of expression), while UNESCAP's words 'consensus oriented' do touch upon the notion of the so-called third generation of human rights, by referring to the long-term perspective "on what is needed for sustainable human development". Further to that, the description of 'effectiveness and efficiency' includes notions such as "sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of the environment", being notions that are more and more linked to the concept of human rights. In addition, the phrase 'rule of law' is rightly said to refer to the "full protection of human rights", although it might mean much more than the UNESCAP author(s) of that line had in mind when writing it down. That is to say: the United Nations have adopted about hundred human rights instruments, 10 covering a huge diversity of rights. Some of these rights would be more important than others, in general as well as from the perspective of good governance. 
Six ongoing African operations
The six UN operations will be discussed in chronological order, thereby first for a correct understanding shortly describing to what problem they want to be the solution, 11 followed by a short presentation of the relevant parts of their mandates. (MINURSO, 1991-) 
Western Sahara
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• to implement the repatriation programme (…);
• to identify and register qualified voters;
• to organise and ensure a free and fair referendum and proclaim the results. • to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance (…);
• to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Liberia, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including refugees, returning refugees and internally displaced persons, women, children, and demobilised child soldiers (…);
• to assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police (…); • to assist the transitional government in the formation of a new and restructured Liberian military (…);
• to assist the transitional Government (…) in re-establishment of national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both the national and local levels;
• to assist the transitional government (...) in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;
• to assist the transitional government in restoring proper administration of natural resources;
• to assist the transitional government (…) in preparing for national elections (… • to contribute to arrangements taken for the security of the institutions and the protection of officials of the Transition in Kinshasa until the integrated police unit for Kinshasa is ready to take on this responsibility and assist the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of order in other strategic areas (…); • to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided, and assist in the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;
• to contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process (…), by assisting in the establishment of a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections to take place.
It was further decided, by the same Resolution, that MONUC will also have the mandate to provide advice and assistance to the transitional government and authorities, as to:
• essential legislation, including the future constitution;
• security sector reform, including the integration of national defence and internal security forces together with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the police, while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms;
• the electoral process. • to facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance (…);
• to facilitate (...) the re-establishment by the Government of National
Reconciliation of the authority of the state throughout Côte d'Ivoire; • to provide oversight, guidance and technical assistance to the Government of National Reconciliation (…) to prepare for and assist in the conduct of free, fair and transparent electoral processes linked to the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, in particular the presidential election;
• to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights in Côte d'Ivoire with special attention to violence committed against women and girls, and to help investigate human rights violations with a view to help ending impunity;
• to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNOCI among local communities and the parties, through an effective public information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of a UN radio broadcasting capability;
• to assist the Government of National Reconciliation (…) in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d'Ivoire, and to advise the Government of National Reconciliation on the restructuring of the internal security services;
• to assist the Government of National Reconciliation (…) in reestablishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout 
58/252
• to contribute (…) to the security of the operations of identification of the population and registration of voters (…);
• to contribute (…) to the security of the areas where voting is to take place;
• to provide (…) for logistical support for the Independent Electoral Commission, in particular for the transportation of electoral material. 
Sudan (UNAMIS/UNMIS, 2004 -)
Sudan became independent in 1956 and has had many conflicts since then.
The recently ended north-south civil war began in 1983. For about two decades, the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the main rebel movement in the south, fought over resources, power, the role of religion in the state, and self-determination. Over two million people died, four million were uprooted and some 600,000 people fled the country as refugees. In July 2002, the parties to the conflict signed the 'Machakos Protocol', in which they reached a specific agreement on a broad framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government, as well as, among other things, on the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan. The parties agreed to continue talks on the outstanding issues of power sharing, wealth sharing, human rights and a ceasefire. Cease-fire on the Conflict in Darfur. 53 The mandate since then includes, among other things, the tasks:
• to assist the parties (…) in the preparations for and conduct of referendums provided for in the Darfur Peace Agreement;
• to assist the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all people of the Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability and to assist the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement to develop and consolidate the national legal framework.
The six mandates under a good governance lens
In the present section, the notions of good governance as elaborated upon in the introductory chapter of this paper will be linked to the descriptions of the six mandates as performed in the previous section. 61/252
Western Sahara
The mission in Western Sahara is even at first sight a 'good governance mission', although at its beginning (in 1991) the words 'good governance'
were not yet very common, at least not in peace and security circles. In the results the mission aims for, one can see many of the good governance elements as discussed in section one, especially under the labels of 'participation', 'consensus oriented' (that is to say: trying to find a way out, while "balancing different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society", but not necessarily leading to a real consensus; that is also part and parcel of referenda), 'accountability' (choosing for a system in which the government "is accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions"),
'transparency' (decision-making, based on information that is "freely available and directly accessible"), 'equity and inclusiveness' (ensuring that all persons belonging to the Western-Sahara people "feel that they have a stake [in the referendum] and do not feel excluded"), and finally: 'the rule of law' (accept the outcome of the referendum, while in the (long) process of working towards it, enforcing the (legal) rules of the games impartially, with respect for such human rights as freedom of expression, the right not to be detained for political reasons, et cetera).
Also the other elements, mentioned before, such as taking care that the future government will be "responsive to the present and future needs of society" are clearly part of the mission's task. The latter is closely related to a right which is generally seen as either a right that belongs to the human rights codex or as a collective right that precedes individual human rights: the right to self- 
Liberia
The UN peacekeeping operation in Liberia is also in many ways a good governance operation, although a bit less explicitly and detailed as is the case with the operation in Western Sahara. Nevertheless, elements such as 'participation' are reflected in the issue of the assistance of the government as to the preparation of national elections (although it should be observed that even free and fair elections do not necessarily lead to good and equitable participation in the governments afterwards). Notions as the ones on transparency and responsiveness are reflected in, among other things, the mandate to assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia "consistent with democratic policing", while issues such as effectiveness and efficiency can be found back in the mandate to assist the government in the re-establishment of national authority throughout the country, "including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both the national and local levels" and in words such as "developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions".
Further to this, there is quite some attention in the mandate of the Liberian peacekeeping operation for the rule of law ("consolidate (…) a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions") and for human rights, including the rights of vulnerable groups (such as refugees and internally displaced persons, women, children, and demobilised child soldiers).
Finally, in relation to Liberia it is worth recalling that according to UNESCAP 
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operation by the task "to assist the transitional government in restoring proper administration of natural resources".
Democratic Republic of the Congo
As is the case with Liberia, the UN operation in the Congo is first of all a peace and security mission. Nevertheless, in the case of the Congo as well, it is clear that the UN Security Council is convinced that a standstill in the hostilities is only a part of the larger scene, including the need of establishing sustainable governance structures, based upon respect for underlying core values. Notions such as participation can be found in the mandate lines on contributing to "the successful completion of the electoral process" and "assisting in the establishment of a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections to take place", while the effectiveness and efficiency of core tasks of the government, in casu performing its police and defence tasks, are reflected in such notions as "to contribute to arrangements taken for the security of the institutions and the protection of officials of the Transition in Kinshasa", "assist the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of order in other strategic areas"
and "security sector reform, including the integration of national defence and internal security forces".
It is also interesting to observe from a good governance perspective that the mandate speaks of training and monitoring the police, "while ensuring that they are democratic and fully respect human rights and fundamental freedoms".
Further to this the human rights issue is again mentioned in relation to vulnerable groups, while the mandate also speaks of assisting "in the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons". That is an issue of refugee law as well as human rights law. The rule of law, finally, is reflected in such notions as providing "advice and assistance to the transitional government and authorities, as to essential legislation, including the future constitution".
Ethiopia and Eritrea
Although several other ongoing UN peacekeeping operations in Africa are dealing with transboundary issues, the operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea is the 64/252 only one to deal with a real inter-state (border) conflict. And where the core of the mandate relates to the cessation of the hostilities, the governance structures of both parties are not addressed. The mandate speaks of the task "to coordinate the Mission's activities (…) with humanitarian and human rights activities of the United Nations and other organizations in those areas", but that is more a governance issue related to the UN operation itself than to the warring parties.
Côte d'Ivoire
Having a look at the mandate of the UN operation in Côte d'Ivoire through a good governance lens, it should be clear again that UNOCI is first of all a peace and security operation, trying to reach a stand still in the hostilities. In terms of governance relevance, it is important to underline, however, that the mandate also stresses the need of re-establishing "the authority of the State throughout 65/252
Sudan
To what extent is the mandate of UNMIS related to (good) governance?
Although the mandate does not use the word 'governance', several parts of it are overlapping with the good governance criteria as used in this paper. One can think of such elements as assisting the parties to the peace agreement "in restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a police training and evaluation programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police", assisting the parties "in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all people of Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability and to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to develop and consolidate the national legal framework", ensuring "an adequate human rights presence, capacity, and expertise within UNMIS to carry out human rights promotion, civilian protection, and monitoring activities", providing "guidance and technical assistance (…) to support the preparations for and conduct of elections and referenda provided for by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement", contributing towardsinternational efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan, as well as to coordinate international efforts towards the protection of civilians with particular attention to vulnerable groups including internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and children (….).
The expansion of the mandate to Darfur in August 2006 also clearly relates to several good governance elements. It will do to recall notions such as assisting the parties "in the preparations for and conduct of referendums provided for in the Darfur Peace Agreement" and "in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary". Further to that the mandate of the operation includes the task to assist the parties "to develop and consolidate the national legal framework" and as to "the protection of human rights of all people of the Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability". The latter is a good governance notion par excellence.
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4 Reflections upon the changing nature of peacekeeping operations
Introduction
As is shown in the description and analysis of the six African cases, UN peacekeeping operations are about much more than strict peace and security elements only. They time and again refer to good governance related issues, from literally working towards building up a stable and accountable government to the taking into consideration of core values underlying it, especially respect for human rights and the systematic inclusion of minority perspectives in decision-making. The present section further reflects and elaborates upon this trend.
Rwanda and the pressure to create new mandates
It was mentioned that UN peacekeeping in the 1990s was confronted with some dramatic failures. Two of these operations, generally considered to be black pages in the UN history of peacekeeping, 55 related to Africa: the operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II, April 1992-March 1995) and Rwanda (UNAMIR, October 1993 -March 1996 . It would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them systematically, but given the scope it would be good to try to learn some good governance related lessons. These lessons can be drawn, for instance, from the work of the Independent Inquiry Commission that was given the task by the UN to scrutinise the UN actions during the 1994 
67/252
While the presence of United Nations peacekeepers in Rwanda may have begun as a traditional peacekeeping operation to monitor the implementation of an existing peace agreement, the onslaught of the genocide should have led decision-makers in the United Nationsfrom the Secretary-General and the Security Council to Secretariat officials and the leadership of UNAMIR -to realize that the original mandate, and indeed the neutral mediating role of the United Nations, was no longer adequate and required a different, more assertive response, combined with the means necessary to take such action.
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Although the word governance is not used by the Inquiry Commission, it should be clear that this is what it is all about: changing governance structures and tactics in order to protect innocent (and less innocent) people against their governments and against one another, and to help creating interim situations as well as more durable structures, in which populations can survive firstly and subsequently, dare to think in terms of future perspectives. Or in terms of this paper: good governance structures, all elements included. In relation to UNAMIR, it was observed in a recent PhD thesis that the policy tools Rwanda was desperately in need of -such as verification of human rights violations, the organisation of elections and election monitoring -were not even included in UNAMIR's mandate, and that "the genocide could take place when good governance was nowhere to be found". 58 That is in a few words one of the core lessons to be learnt -and that has been learned -from the crisis in Rwanda. In this respect, Rwanda has not been an exclusive case, but together with for instance the UN Peacekeeping operation in Bosnia (UNPROFOR 1992 (UNPROFOR -1995 it urged new ways of thinking.
The character of the (African) conflicts to be addressed
Before elaborating upon these 'new ways of thinking' it would be good to spend a few additional words upon the conflicts the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa have to address. In this paper's section on the present six UN operations many specific characteristics of the ongoing conflicts have been mentioned. Structural factors relate to issues of governance and the functioning of State with regard to its relationship with the citizenry, legitimacy, ability to provide basic services and mode of governance. They manifest themselves in weak or overly strong autocratic governments, rampant inequities among the population, corruption, discrimination, extreme poverty and deprivation, human rights deficiencies and a weakened system of adjudication. These cause disaffection among the population, which could eventually lead to uprisings, insurgencies and violent confrontation with established authority.
Proximate factors differ only by degree from structural causes. When discrimination becomes legitimized in the promulgation of laws that target a particular ethnic group, religion or clan, or if there is a precipitous decline in the standard of living, the conditions of conflict become heightened.
These factors are one step removed from the triggers of conflict. There are sudden social traumas that spark off hostilities. In Rwanda, for example, there were many elements in the relationship between the Hutus and Tutsis that constituted structural and proximate causes of violence, but it took the shooting down of the presidential aircraft to trigger off the genocide.
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In Grey-Johnson's words "a typical African country in conflict is poor, with weak government and public institutions, a small private sector, high illiteracy, a narrow skills base and limited capabilities for guaranteeing security", and that 
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state of affairs "is rendered even more dire by civil strife, whose effects on the economy and the society at large are debilitating", whilethe situation after the conflict is one of destruction: infrastructure destroyed; basic services, water and fuel supplies, and electricity disrupted or lost; and transportation system barely functioning. Many professional and skilled personnel would very likely have left the country, thus severely circumscribing the ability of institutions to function.
60
And "even where the structures and institutions of democracy do exist, they are usually weak and unable to sustain the workings of a democratic system".
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Grey Johnson is no doubt right as to his observations on Africa, although one
should not forget that all these phenomena are not exclusively African. And even if there would be a typical African set of problems the solutions to these problems would not be typically African.
From peacekeeping to building stable governance structures
Apart from being failures in themselves, (non-)operations like the ones in These very illustrative introductory words were followed by a range of observations, in which the disastrous operations of the 1990s are used to sharpen the focus of the UN peacekeeping operations. Some of these observations are relevant from the point of view of the good governance scope of the present paper. After having observed that "the new breed of intra-state conflicts have certain characteristics that present United Nations peacekeepers with challenges not encountered since the Congo operation of the early 1960s", that these conflicts are "usually fought not only by regular armies but also by militias and armed civilians with little discipline and with ill-defined chains of command", and that "civilians are the main victims and often the main targets", the 1995 Agenda states that "the combatant authorities, in so far as they can be called authorities, lack the capacity to cope with them". 64 The
Agenda then adds thatanother feature of such conflicts is the collapse of state institutions, especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos. Not only are the functions of government suspended, its assets are destroyed or looted and experienced officials are killed or flee the country. This is rarely the case in inter-state wars. It means that international intervention must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and must include the promotion of national reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government. 
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The 1995 Agenda successively discusses the instruments that would be available to the UN to do all this -such as preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, peace-keeping, post-conflict peace-building, disarmament, sanctions, and enforcement action -before concluding as follows:
The times call for thinking afresh, for striving together and for creating new ways to overcome crises. This is because the different world that emerged when the cold war ceased is still a world not fully understood. The changed face of conflict today requires us to be perceptive, adaptive, creative and courageous, and to address simultaneously the immediate as well as the root causes of conflict, which all too often lie in the absence of economic opportunities and social inequities. Perhaps above all it requires a deeper commitment to cooperation and true multilateralism than humanity has ever achieved before.
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These words can be seen as realistic and prophetic at the same time. At the UN level they have been succeeded five years later by a thorough analysis of the UN peacekeeping system and practice by the Panel on United Nations
Peace Operations, the previously mentioned 'Brahimi report'. 67 The Panel report criticises the often vague mandates of the Security Council, sending out poorly armed and trained soldiers, the inadequate financing and numbers of personnel, the inadequate planning, and the mismanagement in the field, et cetera, 68 but also contains constructive recommendations in the field of preventive action and peace-building strategies. In the latter field, the report comes up with a series of observations, some of which are directly relevant for the core of the present paper, for instance the one on elections:
(…) 'free and fair' elections should be viewed as part of broader efforts to strengthen governance institutions. Elections will be successfully held only in an environment in which a population recovering from war comes to accept the ballot over the bullet as an appropriate and credible mechanism through which their views on government are represented. Elections need the support of a broader process of democratization and civil society building that includes effective civilian governance and a culture of respect for 72/252 basic human rights, lest elections merely ratify a tyranny of the majority or be overturned by force after a peace operation leaves.
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The same goes for the recommendation on police forces and the rule of law:
(…) United Nations civilian police monitors are not peacebuilders if they simply document or attempt to discourage by their presence abusive or other unacceptable behaviour of local police officers -a traditional and somewhat narrow perspective of civilian police capabilities. Today, missions may require civilian police to be tasked to reform, train and restructure local police forces according to international standards for democratic policing and human rights, as well as having the capacity to respond effectively to civil disorder and for self-defence.
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And for the recommendation on embedding human rights into peacekeeping operations:
(…), the human rights component of a peace operation is indeed critical to effective peace-building. United Nations human rights personnel can play a leading role, for example, in helping to implement a comprehensive programme for national reconciliation.
The human rights components within peace operations have not always received the political and administrative support that they require, however, nor are their functions always clearly understood by other components. Thus, the Panel stresses the importance of training military, police and other civilian personnel on human rights issues and on the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law.
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These observations do lead to a set of 'key recommendations', amongst which one can find the following governance related wordings:
The Panel recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in postconflict environments. 
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The tone has thus been set by the Agenda for Peace and the Brahimi report, one might say. Their approach can be found back and is elaborated upon in a Our record of success in mediating and implementing peace agreements is sadly blemished by some devastating failures. Indeed, several of the most violent and tragic episodes of the 1990s occurred after the negotiation of peace agreements -for instance in Angola in 1993 and in Rwanda in 1994. Roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years. These two points drive home the message: if we are going to prevent conflict we must ensure that peace agreements are implemented in a sustained and sustainable manner. Yet at this very point there is a gaping hole in the United Nations institutional machinery: no part of the United Nations system effectively addresses the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace.
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The Peacebuilding Commission would have to be active in the immediate aftermath of wars, in order to …improve United Nations planning for sustained recovery, focusing on early efforts to establish the necessary institutions (… Presenting it this way, there are many links to the concept of good governance.
The UN Member States' meeting at the occasion of the 60 th Birthday of the UN, indeed decided to establish a Peacebuilding Commission "as an intergovernmental advisory body", 80 focusing "attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development". 81 In addition, the commission should…provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery.
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Although the word(s) '(good) governance' are not used, it is clearly and basically about nothing else. The Brahimi report underscored the necessity of multi-dimensional missions. Therefore, as an initial step in the process of establishing a peacekeeping operation, United Nations Head Quarters in New York sets up an Integrated Mission Task Force, which includes expertise from the various components of the UN system such as: the Military, Political, Rule of Law, Human Rights, Child Protection, Administration, Public Information (…). In essence UN forces can only be effective if their activities are planned, coordinated and echeloned into a Mission area of responsibility in a complementary manner (…). It is crucial that the various components communicate and work hand in hand. The components should understand that they are mutually dependant and should work together, through information sharing, particularly in areas such as how to protect the force, protection of civilians under imminent threat, investigations of human rights violations, etc.
89
And specifically in relation to MONUC:
In MONUC, the military component and the human rights division work closely together not only at the level of the Head Quarters in Kinshasa but also in the field (MONUC has some 15 field offices across the country with a total of 110 Human Rights Officers). Military operations are always planned in close collaboration with our human rights colleagues to engage spoilers of the peace and electoral process as well as violators of human rights. Military operations usually result in a displacement of villagers who are then in need of shelter, food, medical care, security, etc. To effectively address this fall-out is yet another task of MONUC. The military component is also mandated to ensure the protection and security of 77/252 the Human Rights Officers who are investigating the abuses. Our force has sustained casualties in some tragic circumstances whilst escorting civilian human rights colleagues doing their work -all part of our military business but a frustrating part nonetheless. Crispin Grey-Johnson, the Gambian representative to the UN quoted before, observes that by giving too much prominence to security responsibilities that need a military predominance in UN peace operations, the requirements for reconstruction, rehabilitation and relaunching of democratic and economic development processes are downplayed and become unresponsive to the need for recovery and the functioning of basic infrastructure and government services.
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Wording the problems this way, he is touching upon the core issue of this paper. A focus upon military aspects might be needed and might even have to be given priority, depending on the concrete situation, but if it is not incorporated in a broader analysis of the situation and in a full range of measures and activities, UN peacekeeping operations will never contribute or ultimately lead to stable solutions. Conflicts will reoccur as soon as the operations have ended, for instance because temporarily side-lined leaders will again take up their weapons or will start supporting new generations of rebels, telling them what kind of injustice is done to them.
In this paper it is shown that the times are changing and that the (desirability of) military predominance in UN peace operations is not so clear anymore.
Discussing the six ongoing UN peacekeeping operations in Africa, it is shown that in most cases, despite differences, a clear 'second focus' upon good governance issues, as framed in this paper, has been inserted in or added to the mandates.
The presentation and discussion of the six mandates was followed by a further reflection upon trends in UN peacekeeping that have occurred after the major failures of the 1990s. In that respect, the paper firstly refers to the analysis made of the Rwandese disaster by the Independent Inquiry Commission ("the 96 Grey-Johnson supra n 59.
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onslaught of the genocide should have led decision-makers in the United Nations (…) to realize that the original mandate was no longer adequate"); followed by some observations as to the complex situation in many African countries. They are, as Grey-Johnson observes, characterised by poverty, weak public institutions, a small private sector, high illiteracy, a narrow skills base and limited capabilities for guaranteeing security, all this being accompanied by civil strife, while the situation after the conflict is often one of total destruction. In later years, the approach taken by the Brahimi report has been practiced, so to say, although not as a handbook that provide for solutions for all kinds of concrete cases. It serves more as a general source of inspiration, expressing the overall approach that should be followed. Practical translations can be found in some of the (revised) mandates of the six African operations, but also, in a more structural sense, in the strengthening of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the establishment, in 2005, of the Peacebuilding Commission. Although the word(s) '(good) governance' are not used in the mandate of the Peacebuilding Commission, it is clearly meant to deliver decisive contributions to that. On a practical note it is also observed in the 80/252 paper that the African Union keeps seeking for a balance between solving African problems of its own and cooperation with, inter alia, the UN. Sometimes it is thought that one could and should do without the UN, but reality so far makes clear that in many problematic situations that would be a problematic route. That is to a large extent related to the complexity of the issues that have to be solved, but also to the lack of leadership and preparedness and ability to transcend the level of daily struggling.
But there is more. Taking into account that all African cases in which the UN assists or intervenes by means of a peacekeeping operation or in which it will have to assist or intervene in the future -have their specific characteristics, it would not be easy to identify a range of factors that have to be taken into account in order to improve the chances of a successful completion of UN missions. There is no simple or uniform recipe. Nevertheless, I would like to conclude this paper with three observations that would be relevant for all operations:
• Firstly, take care of the economic root causes of conflicts, including especially the issue of abuse of natural resources. It is the economic dimension of conflicts, which is not discussed in this good governance oriented paper, but which is in many cases of primordial interest.
• Secondly, invest systematically in governmental structures and legal institutions, while seriously training police, army and judiciary staff, in terms of the skills they have to learn and the values they have to take into account while acting. The latter is about respect for the human rights of those they are dealing with, of participation by neglected minorities, of seriously obstructing the standard practice of using violent means to resolve conflicts, but also about corruption and other legitimacy undermining activities.
• Thirdly, take care of a good interplay with local, regional and national governments, and with mixes of state and non-state actors such as land It should be added in all modesty that there is by far no guarantee that efforts conducted along these lines will be successful. The 'old way', however, is anyhow destined to fail. 
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